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REMARKS
KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
MODERN SUPPLY CHAINS AND
OUTMODED CONTRACT LAW
ALAN SCHWARTZ*
These remarks were delivered at the American University Law Review’s
Annual Symposium entitled “New Perspectives: A Discussion on Modern Global
Supply Chains” on January 25, 2019.
Thank you, Nick, for the introduction and for inviting me to speak.
I am grateful to talk at the American University Law Review’s Annual
Symposium, particularly because it is such a well put together and
thoughtful symposium. This is evident from the scheduled panels for
later today and for those that happened this morning. It is great to
talk to such a distinguished and very large audience.
A subject of this conference is supply chain management. Thus, I
thought it would be apt to talk about supply chain management.
This is a subject that initially seems very close to the ground for
theoretically-oriented lawyers and professors, but it turns out that
supply chain management, in its various forms, has attracted a lot of
attention recently from contract theorists and applied economists, as
well as from business people.
So, unusually for me, I will talk about a hot topic. The question I
will ask, put broadly, is: What roles can contract law and actual
contracting behavior play in improving the efficiency of the modern
supply chain? While I am giving a “current events” talk, I am also
going to link my thoughts to commercial patterns of the past. My
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topic also raises a question about lawyers: What role can lawyers now
play, and what role did they once play, in supply chain management?
My premise is that contract law presupposes particular commercial
patterns, and the lawyer’s role also is importantly a function of those
patterns. Hence, contract law and the lawyers can become outmoded if
the commercial patterns materially change. In recent years, the
commercial patterns, especially as they relate to supply chain management,
have changed materially from the older economic patterns that our
modern contract law, or not so modern contract law, presupposes.
I will argue that neither contract scholarship, nor contract law, nor
what common thinking about what lawyers do, have caught up with
what modern business people are doing. It is helpful to begin with
the nineteenth century, when industrial commerce began in western
countries. The paradigm transaction then was the trade of a standard
good, a simple rake, or a hoe, or a commercial commodity such as
oil, wheat, or corn. Particular features of the goods that were traded
in the nineteenth century deserve remark. The first feature is that
the goods came complete from the manufacturer, the maker, or the
farmer. Second, buyers had little to do with designing, creating or
assembling the goods. The third feature is that many of the goods on
which contract law operated were commonly traded in markets.
These features importantly influenced the creation of nineteenth
century damages law. The relevance of markets is that a disappointed
promisee—the seller or the buyer—could make a substitute
transaction and then be compensated for her economic loss by a
legal award of the difference between the contract price and the
market price plus the cost, which usually was small, of making the
second transaction. I will illustrate how the law functioned with a
simple numerical illustration. People know that math appears in
some of my papers, but today I am going to do math on the second
grade level. When I say, “I am going to do math,” my students think
the second grade level is okay. When I get up to the fourth grade,
there can be a revolution in the classroom.
So suppose that the buyer of certain goods valued them at $100,
and the market price was $75. Because parties transact at the market
price when there is one, the buyer’s expected net gain from the
seller’s performance would be $100 – $75 = $25. Now let the market
price rise to $90 and the seller breach. The commercial premise
underlying nineteenth century law was that the buyer would make a
substitute transaction in the market at the $90 price and then earn
$10: his valuation of $100 value minus the new higher price. But the
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legal damages were the difference between the market and the
contract prices: $90 less $75 equals $15. And even today in our
troubled times, adding $15 to $10 gives you $25, which was the profit
the buyer expected to make.
I want to focus on three things about this simple example. First,
the contract remedy became standard by the end of the nineteenth
century. It was made famous in an opinion by Oliver Wendell
Holmes.1 The compensation premise underlying the law was that the
promisee was entitled to the gain that she could have made under the
contract—no more, but no less. Second, and this is especially
important, the remedy—the contract/market difference—was easily
administered because the judge had only to observe two numbers:
the market price, which was usually public, and the contract price,
which was usually written down. Finally, the lawyer had a very small
role to play, at least at the initiation of the transaction, because the
contracts were so simple. The lawyer just had to write down a price, a
simple product description, and maybe a date of delivery. Sometimes
the business people would write these contracts themselves.
Nineteenth century lawyers’ main entry into this contracting process,
thus, usually occurred when a transaction failed—the promisor
neither delivered the goods nor transferred the required damages
($15 in the example).
Now, these goods were traded in two-level supply chains or threelevel supply chains. They were often sold in sealed packages so that
an intervening wholesaler just retransferred them. This was a
commercial pattern that was essentially set by the end of the
nineteenth century. You might be surprised to know that this also
was the commercial pattern that the First Restatement of Contracts,
which was created in 1932, presupposed. The UCC presupposed the
same simple pattern under which agents traded finished goods in
markets. The UCC was finished in 1952,2 and the principal damage
sections of it, and in the Restatement, were market damages—the
seller’s resale remedy, the buyer’s cover remedy, or just market
damages themselves.

1. See Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903).
2. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, TEXT AND COMMENTS EDITION (Official Draft
1952); see also Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code,
58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 800 (1958) (noting that the text of the UCC was approved by
the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1951 but was not published until 1952).
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To understand how this remedy sometimes was inadequate, we
introduce the idea of asymmetric information: a party sometimes
cannot observe payoff relevant information that the other party
possessed. To see why asymmetric created a concern, realize that the
substitute transaction which the commercial pattern presupposed,
sometimes took a long time to make. In the interim, a buyer/promisee
could not realize value. Although my examples mainly concern buyers,
sellers have the same problem. There could be an interim during which
a seller/promisee would not be compensated for costs incurred and her
profit. Thus, a disappointed promisee would not be fully compensated
unless she recovered both market damages and delay losses.
The asymmetric information problem, as regards to delay losses, is
simple to state but hard to solve. Suppose, then, that a buyer/promisee
claimed that the goods would have been worth v* to him. If it took the
promisee T periods to transact elsewhere and the price is p, his delay
loss is T(v* – p). If the seller could not observe v*, however, the buyer
has an incentive to exaggerate. Similarly, if a seller/promisee claimed
that her costs were c* and she had a delay loss, but the buyer could not
observe c*, she has an incentive to exaggerate. Because the promisor in
these cases is uninformed, the disappointed promisee may recover too
much. On the other hand, when information is hard for a promisor to
observe, it often is hard for the promisee to prove in court. Because
the promisee has the burden of proof, in this version of the problem,
a disappointed promisee may recover too little. We are about 120
years away from when this asymmetric information problem first
arose, and we are not much closer to a good legal solution.
It may be helpful to say a little more about why sophisticated parties
may be uninformed. In our example, the buyer valued the goods at
$100. Consider a seller selling standard goods to buyers in several
markets, including our illustrative buyer—a modern example might be
selling a computer, which could be used in a variety of industries.
Such a seller could not know what the valuation is of the many buyers
in these different markets. Similarly, a computer buyer may know little
about how computers are made or what their production cost is.
This asymmetric information concern also presents before
litigation. Contract law gives the seller, say, the choice between
performing the contract or breaching and paying expectation
damages. The seller, as we said, could know market damages, but if
the seller could not observe the buyer’s value, she could not predict
the delay damages: they would be the difference between the buyer’s
value and the price for the relevant period. Hence, the seller can be
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in a position of not knowing whether breach and paying damages or
performing at a loss is her least costly alternative. Thus, if her costs
turn out to be high, she is bearing substantial risk. And, turning to
the time when the parties contract, if the seller cannot anticipate
potential damages, she does not know how to price. Asymmetric
information thus can create problems for parties at every stage of
their relationship. So, even though our simple goods transaction is
ancient, it poses a very modern problem.
The nineteenth century common law attempted to solve this
problem in a simple way. It created an incentive for the informed
party to tell. To see how, consider Hadley v. Baxendale,3 which all of
you have read in law school. In that case, the court focused on the
time the parties contracted. There the railroad, the seller of carrying
services, could not know the buyer’s valuation, i.e., what the buyer’s
lost profit would be if delivery was delayed.4 As such, the buyer could
not recover the profit. And the incentive was this: if a buyer knows
that the seller is unlikely to know his valuation, he must disclose that
valuation at contract time or be unable to recover value damages
later. So, essentially, the common law tried to handle the asymmetric
information problem by requiring the party who knew things to tell
the other party who did not know things. Now, you may think that
this solution would be good enough, but it really is not good enough
because telling poses problems of its own.
It may be costly for a party just to describe in a believable way what
she expected to get out of the transaction—that is, her valuation or
profit. Sometimes, that information is soft and not entitled to belief
because it is projections about future gains and losses.5 Further,
buyers, as do sellers, but I will focus on buyers, have reason to conceal
their valuations. Suppose that I am a buyer, and I am dealing with a
seller with market power. The seller would want to know what my
valuation is because that would then turn out to be the price. The
seller would extract all of the buyer’s gain by charging the highest
price the buyer could pay. So, while telling is the common law
solution, telling is not a complete solution. This raises the question:
What else the law and the lawyers could do to fix this basic, ancient,
but very deep, commercial problem? There are two things.

3. 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
4. Id.
5. See generally Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, The Law and Economics of Costly
Contracting, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 2 (2004).
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One solution would be to create a liquidated damage clause; the
parties write in the contract a number (value less price or price less
cost) that the breacher would have to pay. This would solve the
asymmetric information problem because a court could once again
compare two numbers. To be sure, a buyer would not want to
disclose if he was dealing with a monopolist, but otherwise the
liquidated damage clause was helpful for communicating information
because it was a nice summary statistic. The other solution would be
to request specific performance. If a party could get specific
performance, he did not have to disclose anything. All he had to do
was get an order that the other party should deliver the goods or pay
the price. So, a party could keep her valuation secret, but at the same
time, be fully compensated.
Now, these contractual fixes are supposed to supplement the
common law “make the promisee tell rule,” but the fixes run into two
ancient doctrines that plague us today. First, penalties are not
permitted in contracts. This means that the liquidated damage clause
is subject to judicial review as not being a reasonable expectation of a
party’s valuation. That raises greatly the cost of using these clauses
and creates uncertainty as to whether a particular clause is
enforceable or not. The other ancient legal doctrine that plagues us
today is that the equitable remedies such as specific performance are
discretionary with the court. This essentially means that judges will
not enforce terms in contracts that ask for specific performance.
At this stage of the game, I want to make an interim point, which is
that we have a transaction—a simple procurement sale—that
originated in the nineteenth century. Current contract and sales law
is premised on that transaction but, even today, cannot fully solve the
problems the transaction poses. So, as you can see, when we get to
modern supply chain management, we can be in very deep waters.
At this point it is helpful to discuss the lawyer and the lawyer’s role.
That role has changed materially because the lawyer now can help at
the initiation stage, as well as the litigation stage of a transaction. For
example, if a party wants to get specific performance, she should tell
her lawyer. The lawyer can then write a “whereas clause” that will say
just why no legal remedy would be adequate. If both parties agree to
a “whereas” clause that explains why damage remedies would be
under compensatory, judges today are predisposed to grant specific
performance. So, today we can overcome at least the reluctance of
judges to enforce specific performance clauses because they can be
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persuaded by good lawyering that specific performance is needed.
The penalty doctrine on the other hand remains a big obstacle.
I want to make what may seem a brief digression now and discuss
an article that Juliet Kostritsky talked about earlier, by Stewart
Macaulay.6 I think you will see that there is a transition to what we
will discuss later. Stewart surveyed Midwestern manufacturers in the
1960s, and he found that the operating employees never talked about
the formal contracts that were supposed to govern their relationships.7
The business people worked out disputes through renegotiation and
one of the famous quotes he published was that the business people say
they take the lawyer’s contract and put it in the drawer.8
Now, this should not have been surprising in 1960, when Stewart
got his data, because, you recall, the contracts then were simple.
They had a price and a description—one widget, or a lathe, or
something like that. They had a delivery date and maybe a quantity,
and that would be it. So, if the subject of sale was a complicated
product, which started to happen in the 1950s and 1960s when
people started trading complex machines, the business people would
find little in the contract to help them. So, why look at it? People
had to work things out because at that stage of the game, the
contracts did not catch up with the new commercial patterns that had
begun to emerge in the early post-World War II economies.
There also was a problem that Stewart elided. If you make a deal
today because you think it is a good deal, and the world does not
change very much when you are supposed to perform, usually you
will be happy to perform. Otherwise, because the world is much like
it was, it is easy for parties to settle difficulties informally. In settled
times, legal enforcement of the underlying contract is unnecessary.
And as a corollary, it isn’t necessary to refer to the contract. So, there
is a question about what role the contract plays, and the answer is that
the contract becomes important when the world changes a whole lot.
Things turn out to look much worse to a party at performance time
than they looked at contract time. And then the contract functions
to structure the renegotiation that the parties will attempt and to
control the lawsuit if renegotiation fails.

6. See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 21 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 59.
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So, what you have to realize about modern contracts is they play
two roles in addition to the roles of facilitating specific performance
or specifying the damage remedy in advance. One role is to map out
the deal. Lawyers and clients realized that if a contract is going to be
helpful at dispute time, it has to have a lot more than a price and a
product description. The contract has to describe in detail what each
party is supposed to do so that it can guide or prevent disputes. It is a
roadmap when parties may have disputes later on. This is one reason
why modern contracts tend to be very long. The second new
function is that contracts exist to govern the unusual case. The
contract is supposed to play a role mainly when parties disagree, and
then it tells what the parties should do and what they get if they
disagree. These new functions should illuminate how lawyers and
courts should understand contracts today. And this modern vision
poses complicated problems for lawyers. One relevant implication is
that the law school contracts course (or the advanced course) should
ask what roles the law and the lawyers can play in connection with
modern business problems, as well as teaching what the rules are.
In addition, today trading finished goods remains common, but
what is also common is having goods specialized to the needs of
particular buyers. In many current procurement situations, what the
buyer needs can take a long time to make, and it may have to be
made according to detailed specifications. In addition, the buyer may
himself have performance obligations. The contract here structures the
deal by breaking performance down into stages. The contract will
specify the stages at which the seller has to do certain things, the buyer
may have to do certain things, and when payments must be made along
the way. These “progress payments” will match what the seller does.
The crucial point here is that the contract functions more as the parties’
constitution than as a simple contract. Also, the commercial pattern of
specializing goods to buyers’ particular needs raises a new problem, or
maybe the old problem in new form.
The problem is that when goods are specialized, the parties are out
of the nineteenth century world. The disappointed promisee today
often cannot make a substitute transaction because of the goods’
unique aspects. So, if the buyer breaches, the seller cannot simply
resell, and if the seller breaches, the buyer cannot simply cover. In
addition, when the performances are complex, a court may not grant
specific performance because the court lacks the capacity to monitor
specialized actions over time. So, we now are in a world where the
remedies of the UCC and the Restatement presuppose an old
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commercial pattern and do not naturally fit the new commercial
patterns that current legal cases present.
The parties today also face a problem of strategic behavior. If the
seller, say, begins to make a specialized product, the buyer may then
say, “You know I am not so crazy about the price.” The seller would
respond: “But we agreed.” In return, the buyer says: “Well, yes, we
did agree, but I am still not so crazy about the price, and I would like
a lower price.” Alternatively, the buyer may in bad faith argue that
the contract gave him room to renegotiate.
The seller may have produced goods that are much more valuable
to the buyer than anyone else, or specialized her factory to produce
such goods. The seller thus cannot make a substitute sale and would
incur a large loss if the buyer walked away. Now, the seller could sue,
but lawsuits take a long time, they are very costly, and their outcome
can be uncertain, especially if there is asymmetric information.
I actually have been describing an old problem but dressed in new
clothes. The problem, as said, is that valuations and costs often are
unobservable to contracting parties and to the court. But now the
problem is heightened because we are considering a new product—
not a product that exists and as to which there is historical data.
Because proving a loss in this context is difficult to do, the seller is
vulnerable to exploitation by the buyer.
The problem that I am describing has a name: the economists call
it the “hold up problem.” The buyer can hold up the seller (or the
seller can hold up the buyer) to renegotiate better terms after the
seller (or buyer) has specialized resources to the deal. The problem
exists because lawsuits are costly and less effective because of
asymmetric information between the parties and between the parties
and the court, and because courts will not enforce, except after review,
liquidated damage clauses and requests for specific performance.
Now, you might think that a holdup is not an important problem,
but you would be mistaken. Three Nobel Prizes have been given for
economists who worked on hold up problems. Oliver Williamson, Oliver
Hart, and Bengt Holmström won Nobel Prizes recently for theoretically
elegant, but sometimes hard to implement, solutions to this problem.9

9. Oliver E. Williamson won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2009. See
Oliver E. Williamson: Facts, NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/econo micsciences/2009/williamson/facts (last visited June 1, 2019). Oliver Hart and Bengt
Holmström won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2016. See Oliver Hart: Facts,
NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2016/hart/facts
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One solution is worth noting, which is to remove the problem from the
domain of contract law altogether. A solution to the holdup problem is
vertical integration: one of the parties buys the other.
But here again, I want to point out that contract law is outmoded.
Transactions that could give rise to hold up did not figure in the
discussions that produced the UCC and the Restatement. That law,
as I said, presupposes simple sales of finished goods or commodities.
For example, another solution to the holdup problem is to impose a
large penalty on the party that first proposes to renegotiate the price
or other key terms, but penalty terms are unenforceable. To be sure,
penalties can be used to exploit the unwary. So, there might be some
justifiable regulation of penalties, but the point I want to make is that
penalties also can solve contracting problems.10
Penalties can facilitate transactions in which one party has to
specialize its resources to the relationship, and so, make itself subject
to exploitation. Therefore, the law should take a nuanced view of
penalties, but if you look at the UCC or the Restatement, a penalty is
just an unrealistic or unreasonable estimate of what the expectation
interest of the party would be, or a payoff that seems disproportionate
to the recovery a party could get under the contract. But if the penalty
must be disproportionate to be effective, the law is very much out of
step. Thus, there is a question of how the law can be modernized to
solve hold up problems and other problems that the existence of
asymmetric information poses.
I am now up to about 1970 in my historical tour. So what did we
see in the 1980s and 1990s? The common transactions in which
agents trade finished goods or commodities, and still face the classic
problems of delay, proving lost profits, or proving costs, and the
problems of fighting over what the parties actually agreed to, are still
with us. But now the lawyers can help substantially and in fact, have.
The legal practice has largely caught up in terms of writing extensive
contracts with extensive whereas clauses and justifications for what
people contract to achieve. But still, if you actually want to know
what your legal rights are and you only looked at the UCC or at the
Restatement, you will find that they are unhelpful for giving guidance
to commercial actors. Also, you will find that you have to shoehorn

(last visited June 1, 2019); Bengt Holmström: Facts, NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobel
prize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2016/holmstrom/facts (last visited June 1, 2019).
10. See generally Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78
CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 33 (2003).
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modern lawsuits into statutory or restatement terms that fit very well
in 1911 or 1912, but maybe not so much today. As an aside, this raises
the question why contracts courses spend so much time with the UCC
and Restatement and so little time with what today’s lawyers their
clients are actually doing.
Finally, I want to move into the twenty-first century. In the twentyfirst century, the prior patterns of commerce that I have described
still exist, but the newest idea, and I think this was discussed in Juliet
Kostritsky’s talk earlier today, is that parties come together not to buy
or sell something, but to create something. They want to create a
new software program, a new drone, a new app, a new type of
computer; and here, the parties are not so much at arm’s length
where you have a seller and a buyer who are separate entities. The
parties are still jurally separate entities. They are separate entities at
law, but they form what are now called “hybrid arrangements,” and
what they do in these hybrid arrangements is allocate tasks that
contribute to creating a final product among themselves.
One party may do technical R&D, and the other party may study
market prospects. Their contracts are called “framework agreements,”
which are supposed to govern the various stages that the parties have
to go through in order ultimately to create something. These
framework agreements also sometimes contain their own disputeresolution procedures. So, the first time that you have a problem, you
might try and settle it on the shop floor; next you may appeal to a plant
manager. Finally the parties will get up to the chief operating officer
or maybe some resolution board composed of seller and buyer
representatives. The parties can function in this interrelated way
because buyers have personnel inside sellers’ factories, and sellers now
work with buyer procurement offices. Also, there may be more than
two parties engaged in the creation process.11

11. These arrangements are extensively described in a serious of articles by Ronald J.
Gilson, Charles F. Sable, and Robert E. Scott. See generally Ronald J. Gilson et al., Text and
Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23 (2014); Ronald J.
Gilson et al., Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of
Novel Contract Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 170 (2013); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The
Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1377 (2010); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration
and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009); Alan Schwartz & Robert E.
Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661 (2007). For
an examination of theoretical treatment, see Tracy Lewis & Alan Schwartz, Pay to Play: A
Theory of Hybrid Relationships, 17 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 462 (2018).
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I am not going to discuss these arrangements in detail. But the
point that I want to make about them, and this is really the important
current point, is that we now have framework contracts that govern
relationships which are engaged in goods creation and extend
through time, rather than the simpler procurement contracts of
earlier times. And this raises a very important question as to what
contract law can do to facilitate hybrid relationships, or at least not
get in the way of them. I want to put this question in a simple way. If
you look at the introduction to the UCC or the introduction to the
Restatement, in the remedy sections, they say that the law’s goal is to
put a party, the disappointed party, in the same position that party
would have been in had the contract been performed.12 What does
that presuppose? It presupposes a final contract and an identified
product so a court may be able to construct the position that the
party would have been in had the contract been performed.
Now here is a very common hybrid relationship dispute. One party
is supposed to research financing, marketing opportunities, and the
like. The other party is supposed to research the feasibility of various
designs. Then the parties are supposed to report to each other what
they found and go on to another stage. In these situations—and I am
not talking about hypothetical cases, I am talking about litigated
cases—one party has an incentive to shirk: to not do its part. The
party would rather wait to see what the other party comes up with. If
what the other party came up with, say, is that it is going to be very
hard to create a feasible product design, the party who was supposed
to research financing and market opportunities is happy that he did
not do that because there is going to be no ultimate product. Its
investment would have been wasted.
Under current law, what is the remedy for shirking behavior? The
law cannot protect the counterparty’s expectation because there was
no contract and thus nothing for him to expect. You can look at the
UCC in vain for a remedy term that deals with a case where one party
shirks and does not do what it was supposed to do under a
complicated framework agreement, and the other party is really
12. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2001) (stating that “remedies provided
by [the Uniform Commercial Code] must be liberally administered to the end that the
aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully
performed” (alteration in original)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (commenting that courts will enforce remedies to protect a party’s
expectation interest “by attempting to put him in as good a position as he would have
been in had the contract been performed, that is, had there been no breach”).
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angry. The Restatement also says nothing about this situation. On
the other hand, my coauthor and I found approximately 110
appellate cases on this problem in a casual scan search, and we know
that appellate cases are only the tip of the iceberg.13
An economically minded analyst would not worry about the
disappointed party, the party who spent a lot of money trying to
produce designs only to find out that the other party had not done
anything. Ex post, this is just a business loss. The real problem is ex
ante: when parties anticipate that there is no legal remedy if somebody
breaches the framework agreement, parties may be reluctant to enter
into these agreements initially. Today, a disappointed party cannot get
expectation damages, and the law is very unclear as to whether the
party can even get reliance damages for the costs that it has expended.
Thus, there is a well-grounded view that there is less R&D done in our
economy than there should be. So, the point that may be becoming clear
is that we have a nineteenth century contract and commercial law that
must be applied to twenty-first century legal problems. This is not working
well. On the other hand, the lawyers today are starting to become very
helpful. They create ever more detailed framework agreements.
The new contracting idea, which time precludes me from
discussing, is to make it costly for parties to walk away from the
framework, but this kind of lawyering is at a very early stage because it
is not taught in law schools, and it is all being made up on the fly by
smart people who want to help their clients out but who have no
blueprints. So, I think that there ought to be a lot more thought
given to twenty-first century lawyering and what twenty-first century
contract law should look like.
I want to conclude with one more new commercial pattern parties
now conduct affairs in networks. As a consequence, network
economics has become a very big academic field over the last fifteen
or so years. Unfortunately for lawyers, it is very complicated and very
mathematical. But nevertheless, networks pose very serious problems
for the law. For example, suppose you think that you are in one, but
the other people do not think you’re in. What do you do then? Let
me give you a concrete example.
Suppose a bank makes a deal with a merchant where the bank will
process the merchant’s credit cards, and the merchant promises to be
careful when it is extending credit to its customers. The bank then
13. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Market Damages, Efficient Contracting, and
the Economic Waste Fallacy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1610, 1624 (2008).
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makes an agreement with other banks to create a network. The other
banks will process this bank’s credit card receivables and this bank will
process the other bank’s receivables. So, you have, say, a network of ten
banks. Now let the merchant be careless and not monitor customers.
Later banks in the network suffer losses because some receivables are
bad. The merchant, however, only dealt with bank #1. Can bank #6 sue
the merchant for violating its agreement with bank #1 to be careful
about extending credit card debt? That is a very wide open question.
My thesis is that the law and the lawyering should be brought up to
date, but when you look at contract law casebooks, the only legal
doctrine that is relevant is third-party beneficiary law. The question
apparently is whether bank #6 is a third-party beneficiary of the
contract that bank one made with the merchant. Now, first of all, I
want to note, third-party beneficiary law is hardly ever taught because
it is always the last chapter in the casebook. And this is because the
common view is that the subject is not important.
So, nobody knows anything about how the doctrine actually
functions, including law professors, because it is always the last
chapter. What is worse, when you read the last chapter, you find that
the chapter is basically two cases, one decided in 185714 and the other
decided in 1918.15 My co-author Bob Scott and I—well, it was not us,
it was the wonderful research assistants we pay—found, between 2004
and 2014, 1400 appellate cases raising third-party beneficiary claims.16
Now, you would think that people would be writing about this
because it is a hot topic. Think of how many disputes we are having
in society if we have 1400 appellate cases over ten years. But there are
only these two cases in the casebooks, and the last article we found
before our own that was written on third-party beneficiaries appeared
in 1992.17 So our point is that if commercial significance is a criterion
for casebook organization, the third-party beneficiary chapter could
be placed earlier, and then maybe a few of these 1400 cases would be
in it. But neither the casebooks nor the law treat network cases.
Again, commerce is ahead of the law.

14. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
15. Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233 (1918).
16. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Third-Party Beneficiaries and Contractual
Networks, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 329–30 (2015).
17. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358
(1992); see also Schwartz & Scott, supra note 16, at 329 (commenting that the “last serious
article” written about third-party beneficiaries was published twenty-three years ago).
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I want to conclude with two thoughts. First, contract and
commercial law is the law that is in UCC Article Two, which has not
been revised since 1952, or the Restatement Second of Contracts,
which was finished in 1974. But to an observer of the patterns of
commerce that we have today, contract law is wildly out of date. It
gives very little guidance to courts, and it gives very little guidance to
lawyers. And when you think about what the lawyer’s role was in the
old days when the parties could not settle, you either represented the
plaintiff or the defendant, and you ran a lawsuit. While litigation is still
important, the business lawyer’s role today is to create framework
agreements in complicated industries to reduce the probability of
disputes, merger agreements that govern complex business combinations,
and contracts that govern networks. These tasks require the lawyer to
understand a lot about many very difficult business situations. Neither
the law nor the contracts course have caught up.
The last thing that I want to say to tie this to what we heard this
morning, which is that people are very worried about, legitimately
worried about, human rights violations. You have a buyer and you
have a seller, but down the supply chain, people noted there may be
subcontracting. And some of the subcontracting today is to firms that
use slave labor or child labor or otherwise are violating environmental
laws. What people said this morning is that attention has to focus on
the process—not just the end state. And what I am really talking about
here is that attention has to focus on the process. Today the major
issue is not so much, in at least a lot of industries, what does the
finished product look like, and did people deliver it on time?
Today the issue is how was it made? Did people do everything they
were supposed to do in the factory? How do you know? What
happens if someone walks away early in a preliminary arrangement?
So, you have to get behind the last piece of paper in the sequence
and get to the process. Now, what I think is that this is a very exciting
time for lawyers and for contract scholars. The question is how can
we create a twenty-first century contract law that would be relevant to
what people actually do, and from the point of view of law professors
and lawyers, the question is how can we teach potential lawyers to
function in the modern supply and management chain?
So, now I am really going to stop but with one more example.
When you think about the recovery of reliance costs, in most
contracts casebooks, there is a famous case. The case involves a guy
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in Alabama in the 1840s who asked someone to come and care for
him and his spouse.18 But the parties did not write a formal contract.
This person, however, did come and care for the promisor and his
spouse or maybe his aunt, I think, but was not paid. The legal
question is whether the person who moved to Alabama could recover
her costs. And that is how reliance is taught in the contracts course.
Now, I have talked about current reliance cases. What happens when
somebody does not do the R&D they promised to do in a hybrid
relationship and then years down the line just walks away? What
about this person’s (or firm’s) reliance costs? Do you think the case
about the woman who moved to Alabama in 1840 or so has much to
teach students about how to practice contract law today? So, I think
that there should be a lot of changes in contract teaching, in contract
practice, and in contract law.

18. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).

